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Abstract 
The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the structure and dynamics of 
professionals’ forecast of inflation. Recent papers have focused on their 
forecast errors and how they may be affected by informational rigidities, or 
inattentiveness. In this paper we extend the existing literature by considering a 
second form of inattentiveness. While showing that both types of 
inattentiveness are closely related, we focus on the inattentiveness that 
forecasters face when undertaking multi-period forecast and, thereby, the 
expected momentum of inflation. Using number survey-based data for the US 
and UK, we establish a new structure for the professional’s forecast error with 
direct implications for the persistence of real effects  
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I. Introduction  
Most models explaining aggregate outcomes, such as business cycles and inflation 
dynamics, include professionals’ forecasts. Nevertheless, until recently most macroeconomic 
models simply assumed that these forecasts were formed rationally with full information. In a 
recent innovative paper, Fuhrer (2013) includes actual survey expectations of professional 
forecasters, rather than the usual stylized rational expectations, in a DSGE model and finds 
that it performs considerably better by exhibiting strong correlations to key macroeconomic 
variables. Consequently, he proposes methods for endogenizing survey expectations in 
general equilibrium macro models for improving monetary policy. Clearly, this asks for a 
greater understanding of the nature and dynamics of survey expectations of professionals. 
Hence, the present analysis establishes the dynamics of their forecast error which enable 
clearer insights into how to generate better general equilibrium macro models and 
understanding actual inflation dynamics and persistence.   
Recent models have focused on deviations from full-information rational expectations 
due to informational rigidities (see, for example, Mankiw and Reis (2002), Woodford (2003) 
and Sims (2003)). The different forms of information rigidities, or agent’s inattentiveness, 
form the basis of the competing rational expectations models with informational frictions. 
Firstly, there is the sticky-information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002). Here the agents 
update their information set sporadically. Agents do not continuously update their 
expectations but choose an optimal time at which to be inattentive, that is they receive no 
news about the economy until it is time to plan again. The slow diffusion of information is 
due to the costs of acquiring information as well as the costs of reoptimization. Such sticky 
information expectations have been used to explain not only inflation dynamics (Mankiw and 
Reis, 2002) but also aggregate outcomes in general (Mankiw and Reis, 2006) and the 
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implications for monetary policy (Ball et al., 2005). The second type of informational friction 
models (Woodford (2003) and Sims (2003)) argue that agents update their information set 
continuously but can never fully observe the true state because of signal extraction problems. 
Importantly, as pointed out by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), henceforth CG, both 
types of model predict quantitatively similar forecast errors.   
The purpose of the present paper is to consider these rational expectations models with 
information frictions in the light of a new, or additional, form of inattentiveness. Using the 
simple framework suggested in CG, where forecast errors are investigated empirically as 
deviations from the full-information rational expectations, we consider two forms of 
inattentiveness. In the existing literature the standard inattentiveness arises when the agents 
try to revise or update their expectations formed in the previous period. We also consider an 
additional form of inattentiveness. Typically, in each period, professional forecasters not only 
revise their forecast from the previous period but also form multi-period forecasts. The 
second form of inattentiveness arises when the agent is trying to distinguish the forecasts 
between the different horizons.  
We show that the first form of inattentiveness is a necessary condition for the second 
form to exist. We also argue that establishing the second form and distinguishing between the 
two forms of inattentiveness sheds valuable insights into the type of information rigidities 
that causes agents’ inattentiveness and, consequently, which rational expectations model with 
informational frictions is likely to prevail. CG suggests a number of interesting empirical 
tests to differentiate between the two sources of information rigidity. The present analysis 
also introduces another test to establish whether imperfect or sticky information prevails.   
We use different survey data of professional forecasters for both the USA and the UK. 
These surveys ask a number of professionals their forecasts over alternative horizons, hence, 
allowing for interesting comparisons. We find strong evidence for both forms of 
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inattentiveness.  A new structure for the professional forecaster’s inflation forecast error with 
clear implications for inflation dynamics and also the aggregate economy is therefore 
indicated.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section outlines the simple theoretical 
framework which forms the basis for empirical analysis. Section III outlines the main data 
and econometric issues raised by our theoretical framework. Section IV reports the estimation 
results. Finally, Section V outlines the summary of the key results and draws the concluding 
remarks. Details about the forecasting process are given in Appendix A1, while alternative 
inflation forecast measures together with other variables of interest are described in Appendix 
A2.  
II. The Two Forms of Inattentiveness: The Theoretical Framework 
When professional forecasters form inflation forecasts, they attempt to revise or update 
forecasts from the previous period. Using the most recently available information, they form 
full-information rational expectations (hereafter referred to as FIRE). However, due to 
informational rigidities, agents are inattentive and their forecasts invariably deviate from 
FIRE. Such deviations arise, for example, when forecasters revise their forecast for the period 
t+h while updating their information set from the previous to the current period (i.e. from t-1 
to t).  We refer to this as the first form of inattentiveness.     
Typically, professional forecasters also form multi-period inflation forecasts. Such 
forecasts capture the expected momentum of actual inflation, so if a shock occurs in the 
current period (t), the forecaster has to determine the propagation of this shock to inflation. 
Will the shock just last into the next forecast period (t+h) or transmit beyond (t+h+1)? One 
way to think this issue is the short-run Phillips curve trade-off. Therefore, for instance, if 
there is a shock that leads to a reduction in unemployment, the forecaster needs to determine 
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the expected momentum that this would have on actual inflation. The ability to observe and 
distinguish the propagation of such shocks leads to the second form of inattentiveness.  
Figure 1 illustrates both forms of inattentiveness:  
Figure 1 [about here]  
FIRE is depicted in the upper part of Figure 1. At time t forecasters make the one-step ahead 
forecast, )( 1ttF  , using all available and updated information: 
1111 )()(   ttt
FIRE
ttt EE        (1) 
and the forecasted inflation rate (where h=1) is FIRE. The middle part of Figure 1 highlights 
the effect of the first form of inattentiveness on the inflation forecast: )( 1ttF   (weighted by 
λ, where 10   ). Finally, the lower part of Figure 1 shows the effect on the forecast 
(weighted by ϕ parameter, 10  ) of the second form of inattentiveness. The additional 
deviation from FIRE depends on the past (in t-1) forecast of inflation momentum. Intuitively, 
this second effect further exacerbates the effect of the first form of inattentiveness.  The 
closer ϕ is to one, the less relevant is the expected propagation of the past shock (in t-1) to the 
one- and two-steps ahead forecast.  
Importantly, the second form of inattentiveness also gives valuable insights into the 
nature of information rigidity. The question is: what generates this type of information 
rigidity and, therefore, which form of rational expectations model with information frictions? 
First and foremost, the existence of the first form of inattentiveness is a necessary condition 
for the second form to exist. The second type of inattentiveness takes place when forecasters 
are trying to form multi-period forecasts in a particular period (for example, period t). The 
only reason forecasters are unable to form forecasts that distinguishes the different forecast 
horizons is because they face a signal extraction problem due to noisy information in the 
period t. Hence, the existence of the second form of inattentiveness clearly suggests that 
information rigidities arise due to imperfect information.   
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Formally, following the CG framework, we can generalize to the horizon h the first 
form of inattentiveness depicted in Figure 1 as:  
)()()1()( 1 htthtthtt FEF        (2) 
The professional forecaster tries in the current period (t) to form an inflation forecast for the h 
period ahead. In the sticky information model   denotes the probability that no new 
information is acquired, while in the imperfect information case it captures the level of noise. 
When forecasters are unable to forecast FIRE, they resort to their previous inflation forecast 
for period t+ h. As shown in CG, the forecast errors are derived by substituting (1) into (2) 
and rearranging as follows:  
hthtthttht FF  

 


 )(
1
)(     (3) 
where )]()([)( 1 htthtthtt FFF    . 
As highlighted above, the second form of inattentiveness arises only when the first 
form is present.
1
 Having to rely on the agents’ forecast momentum in the previous period 
necessitates the second form of inattentiveness. Now forecasters have to rely on their multi-
period forecasts (i.e. on their forecast for period t+h made in period t-1), and noisy 
information would restrict their ability to distinguish between the relevant information 
pertinent for the different horizons.  
In a recent seminal paper, Stock and Watson (2007) put forward a general unobservable 
components (UC) representation of actual inflation rate, where observable inflation rates are 
composed of two components, a stochastic trend (
t ) and a stationary factor, or inflation gap 
(
t )
2
: 
                                                 
1
 In fact, if the first form of inattentiveness does not exist ( 0 ), equation (3) collapses to:
hthttht F    )( , i.e. any explanatory role is left to unpredictable shocks.   
2
 Recent papers have investigated the nature of this stationary component, or inflation gap (see Cogley et al 
(2010) and Nason and Smith (2013)).  
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              ttt    (4) 
and         ttt   1  (4') 
where 
t denotes a trend innovation. The inflation gap, assumed to be persistent, is modelled 
for simplicity as a stationary AR(1) process:  
                     
ttt   1  (5) 
where
t , similar to t , is a martingale difference series. Both t  and t  may be correlated 
and we assume the persistence parameter   to be time-invariant.  
If agents choose to form their inflation forecasts by estimating only the stochastic trend 
component of inflation based on information at time t, we have: 
)()( tthtt FF    (6) 
However, current information may also enable them to include the estimate of the stationary 
component. Hence, equation (6) becomes:   
)()()( tt
h
tthtt FFF    (6') 
Given that: )()()()( tttttttt FFFF  

 , the long horizon forecasts depend 
solely on )( ttF  , while any short horizon forecasts will depend on the estimates of both 
stochastic trend and inflation gap. Therefore, the multi-period forecasts made in t will be 
entirely shaped by the estimates, or forecasts, of the inflation gap )( ttF  . The main purpose 
of the multi-period forecasts is to capture the persistent nature of the stationary component of 
inflation (the inflation gap), or the propagation of any stationary shock. 
This distinction can be elaborated in the context of professional forecasters’ 
inattentiveness. As argued earlier, any inattentiveness when forming multi-period forecasts 
based on current information amounts to an imperfect or noisy information problem. We also 
assume that professional forecasters are able to distinguish between information which 
pertains to trend innovation and the inflation gap. Nevertheless, they observe both 
9 
 
components imperfectly or as noisy signals. Individual professional forecasters i cannot 
observe 
t  and t  directly but receive signals 
i
t  and 
i
t :  
i
tt
i
t    (7) 
i
tt
i
t    (7’) 
where it  and 
i
t  denote the respective noise which may be correlated across agents.  
When revising or updating their inflation forecasts, the ith forecaster forms optimal 
forecasts, given the information set, which includes both the stochastic trend and inflation 
gap, via the Kalman filter. The forecaster estimates, or forecasts, the inflation )( ttF   as 
follows:  
)()1()( 1 t
i
t
i
tt
i
t FGGF    (8) 
where G  denotes the Kalman gain, which represents the relative weight placed on new 
information pertaining to the stochastic trend and inflation gap relative to the previous 
inflation forecasts. The optimal forecast of inflation is: )()( t
i
t
h
ht
i
t FF   .  
On the other hand, when the ith professional forecaster is forming multi-period inflation 
forecasts and, thereby, the estimated momentum of inflation rates, same forecaster focuses on 
information relating to the inflation gap. The ith agent’s forecast of the inflation gap )( t
i
tF   
is: 
)()1()( t
i
t
i
tt
i
t FKKF    (8') 
where K  denotes the Kalman gain, which now represents the relative weight placed on new 
information pertaining to the inflation gap, or inflation momentum, relative to the current 
information enabling the forecasts of the stochastic trend. As shown in Appendix A1, when 
the inflation gap has high levels of signal to noise ratio, its persistence and auto-correlation 
coefficient levels are low and the correlation between the permanent and transitory 
innovations approaches its maximum. Hence, the agent has little, or no, incentive to use past 
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forecasts of inflation gap instead of current forecasts of stochastic trend. In other words, the 
inflation gap mainly matters when forming multi-period forecasts and the alternative is to 
forecast no inflation momentum ( )()( t
i
tht
i
t FF   ). The optimal forecast of the inflation 
gap is: )()( t
i
t
h
ht
i
t FF   .  
Finally, the Kalman gains G and K are both formed independently as the professional 
forecaster is assumed to be able to distinguish information which pertains to trend innovation 
and the stationary component. Also, in each period, the professional forecaster independently 
revises and forms multi-period forecasts. When information is perfect we have 1 KG  
while, if it is noisy, 1G  and 1K . Therefore, )1( G  and )1( K  measure the amount of 
information rigidity. So when agents revise their forecasts (i.e. the first form of 
inattentiveness), both trend innovation and inflation gap matter. On the other hand, when 
agents form multi-period forecasts, the focus is just on the inflation gap and its persistence. 
The expected momentum of future inflation rates matters then. 
Averaging across agents, the second form of inattentiveness can be incorporated by 
extending equation (1) as follows:    
)]()1()([)()1()( 111 htthtthtthtt FFEF      (9) 
where )1( G  denotes information rigidity when revising inflation forecasts, and 
)1( K  denotes information rigidity when observing the stationary component and the 
ability to form multi-period forecasts and momentum of future inflation. Forecasters revert to
)()( 11   htthtt FF   when unable to do so (i.e. when 1 ), bearing in mind that the 
second form of inattentiveness is prevalent only when the first form exists.
3
 By substituting 
                                                 
3
 Interestingly, within our extended inattentiveness model, the Carroll (2003) epidemiological model can be 
specified empirically without ad hoc assumptions (see p. 276) where expectations are affected by a complete 
second-form inattentiveness, i.e. ϕ=1. In fact, under this assumption, our equation (9) becomes: 
)()()1()( 11   htthtthtt FEF  . Being unable to exploit multistep forecasts information, the inattentive 
general public only uses the past h-steps ahead forecast )( 11  httF   rather than )(1 httF   .  
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equation (1) into equation (9) we can derive the following (extended) forecasts error 
structure:  
hthtthtthtthttht FFFF  



 





 )]()([
1
)(
1
)( 111  (10) 
The forecast error now has an additional term that depicts the second form of 
inattentiveness. It directly captures the expected inflation momentum formed in t-1, such that 
may arise due to the short-run Phillips curve trade-off and the persistence of the stationary 
component.  
III: Data and Econometric Issues 
In order to empirically assess fully the forecasters' inattentiveness, we have to use a 
sequence of multi-period forecasts. In the present paper we focus on professional forecasters 
in the US and UK, using two different US datasets (the Survey of Professional Forecasters, 
SPF, and the Livingston Survey, LS) and one UK dataset (the Barclays Basix survey, BB).  
The datasets differ in five aspects: (i) the frequency at which the survey is conducted 
(SPF and BB are quarterly, LS is conducted twice a year); (ii) the predicted inflation 
measures (all three surveys forecast the consumer price index, CPI, while only SPF also 
forecasts the GDP deflator); (iii) the multi-period forecast horizon (the quarterly SPF predicts 
from one to six quarters ahead, the semi-annual LS predicts one and two semesters ahead, 
and the quarterly BB predicts one and two years ahead);
4
 (iv) the available level of 
disaggregation (that is, anonymous agents’ forecasts are available for SPF and LS datasets, 
                                                 
4
 Note that the quarterly releases of SPF predictions have forecasted step lengths of one quarter; since our 
forecast horizon is one year (to be comparable with CG), the use of SPF data to estimate our models implies that 
its regressors are computed by differences between pair of forecasts which are partially overlapping. The same 
is not true for the other two surveys (i.e. their regressors do not come from differences between pairs of 
overlapping forecasts): LS is released by semester, step length of one semester and our forecast horizon is one 
semester; BB is quarterly, with a step length of one year and our forecast horizon is of one year. 
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while only averages of agents’ forecasts by group are available for BB);5 (v) the time span 
covered by the different surveys (SPF forecasts are available from 1965 to date, LS from 
1946 to date, and BB from 1986 to 1995).
6
  
 Such heterogeneity allows for alternative forecast measurements to be exploited, 
thereby assessing the robustness of the estimation results across different forecast horizons 
and frequencies, which are characterized by various degrees of overlapping forecast, groups 
of forecasters and countries. Detailed definitions of the specific time series used in this paper 
are given in Appendix A2, along with the description of their main statistical features. 
 The econometric approach raises two main issues: the possible correlation of 
explanatory variables with the rational expectation forecast error ht  which necessitates 
instrumental variables estimators such as IV and GMM (see Sargan, 1958, and Hansen, 1982, 
respectively) and, related with the use of IV/GMM estimators, the need for all the variables to 
be stationary. Appendix A2 clearly indicates that all the three variables concerned (the 
forecast error, the forecast revision and the forecast momentum) are generated by stationary 
data generation processes in all the three surveys. Hence, they are consistent with the 
statistical properties required by the IV/GMM estimators. 
As also noted in CG, the average (across agents) forecast revisions at time t may be 
affected by a nonzero average noise which, though uncorrelated with information dated from 
t-1 and earlier, is related to the rational expectation error ( ht ). In addition, forecasts may be 
affected by measurement errors (for example, Appendix A2 shows that this is surely the case 
with the LS forecasts). Therefore, consistent coefficient estimates require IV/GMM with 
                                                 
5
 Although anonymous, a LS multinomial variable classifies individual forecasters in groups. Therefore, it is 
possible to compute averages by group also with LS data. As far as SPF is concerned, we cannot use averages 
by group because the SPF multinomial variable is regularly available only since 1991q4.  
6
 Within each survey, specific time series are subject to sample restrictions: in SPF, GDP deflator forecasts start 
from 1970, and CPI inflation from 1980; in LS a statistical reliable CPI measure is given since 1970 (because of 
the small number of agents surveyed before that date); in BB the availability is full for CPI inflation but, since 
2005 Q1, they abandoned collecting the relevant information for professional forecasters and just focused on the 
‘general public’ (i.e. not professional forecasts). 
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instruments dated from t-1 and earlier. However, in view of the Hausman (1978) approach, 
efficient OLS estimates can also be compared with IV/GMM estimates which are consistent 
under both true and false assumptions of orthogonality between the error term and regressors. 
IV. Estimation Analysis and Results: 
Following the derived equation (10) in Section II, the empirical analysis here considers 
the general equation (11) which is able to account for the different datasets described in the 
preceding section
7
: 
hthttthttt
httthtttht
FF
FF














)]()([
1
)(
1
)(
1,1,11
,1,1
  (11) 
The first regressor in equation (11), )( ,1 htttF  )( ,1 htttF   )( ,11 htttF    denotes 
the revision (update) of the forecast over the horizon from t+1 to t+h, measuring the impact 
on the forecast formed in t, namely the information shocks observed in period t. The second 
regressor, )( ,11 htttF   )( 1,1  htttF  , depicts the momentum of the forecast, measured by 
the inflation forecast made in period t-1 and this time made for t+h-1 and t+h.  
In general, when the frequency of the forecast releases is the same as the length of each 
step and shorter than the forecast horizon (h), both regressors in equation (11) are computed 
by differences between pairs of forecasts which may overlap. 
Table 1 reports the estimates for the SPF data when we impose the restriction  = 0. 
This restricted model corresponds to the CG model found in equation (3) of Section II. The 
results in column (1) refer to the GDP inflation, and replicate quite closely those in the first 
column of Table 1 panel B of CG. As expected, the intercept is not significant, and the 
                                                 
7
Appendix A2 outlines how equation (11) must be emended to fit the alternative survey data features. 
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slightly different estimate of information rigidity ( ˆ  = 0.548, while theirs: 0.552) is simply 
due to our longer sample period, ending in 2013q1 rather than in 2010q2.  
Table 1 here 
When we test for parameters' constancy using the Andrews (1993) test statistic for 
structural change with unknown break date, a clear break emerges in 1979q3. This date 
coincides with two relevant events: firstly, the beginning of the Great Moderation phase 
where actual inflation rates became harder to forecast (see Stock and Watson (2007)); and, 
secondly, the beginning - with Volker - of the decline of a phase in which the Federal 
Reserve placed increasing weight on inflation stability and inflation persistence (see Clarida 
et al. (2000), and Beechey and Osterholm (2012) for detailed discussions).  
Subsequently, column (2) in Table 1 reports the OLS estimates after removing the 
1970s from the sample period, focusing only on the period since the Great Moderation. In the 
shorter sample period, the  estimate drops by more than 50%, from 0.55 to 0.25, 
representing a considerable reduction in forecaster inattentiveness. Forecasters’ ability to 
acquire new information improved markedly because since 1980 they perceive inflation to be 
less persistent than the 1970s, when there was larger inflation shocks and loose monetary 
policy.  
The discussion in the preceding section regarding the more appropriate estimator in the 
present context suggests comparing the OLS estimates (with potential bias) with those using 
IV and GMM (both always consistent regardless of the correlation between explanatory 
variables and equation errors). The instruments used here, and elsewhere in the paper, are 
both internal (the first two lags of the actual inflation rate, and one lag of one- and two-steps 
ahead inflation forecasts) and external (lags of the anxiety index, the real time GDP growth,  
the unemployment rate, the Federal funds rate, and its spread with respect to the 10-year 
Treasury constant maturity rate).  
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Columns (3)-(4) respectively report estimates obtained with IV and GMM over the 
whole sample (i.e. including the 1970s decade). Despite the statistically significant Hausman 
test and downwardly biased OLS estimates, both OLS and IV-GMM estimators indicate 
statistically significant information rigidities. The IV-GMM estimates are quite close to those 
reported in column (1) and , over the full sample period, informational rigidity due to forecast 
revisions is significant and above 0.5. The results reported in columns (5)-(7), obtained using 
alternative inflation measures and estimators over the sample period beginning with the 
1980s, is used to assess its robustness. The OLS estimates of CPI inflation (in column 6) 
support the sharp reduction in forecasters' inattentiveness after 1980, while the instrumental 
variables estimates - with (column 4) and without (column 5) from the 1970s – indicate a 
narrower fluctuations than OLS. 
 The overall results in Table 1 suggest that inattentiveness has lowered in the US since 
the start of the Volker mandate (end 70s - beginning 80s), when inflation persistence 
decreased and its predictability was more difficult because of the Great Moderation phase. 
This outcome is quite robust as to the different inflation measures used. The GMM estimates 
are more stable than the OLS ones, even though both estimates are lower. In addition, the use 
of GMM is supported by the Hausman test: the exploitation of instrumental information 
enables GMM to cope better with omitted variable biases and structural breaks. The larger 
GMM inattentiveness estimate when using the GDP deflator (column 5) rather than CPI 
(column 7) can be explained by the greater emphasis on the latter during monetary policy 
debates. 
Finally, it is important to note that the GMM estimator can account for nonzero average 
individual noises which might affect the average forecast revisions and, therefore, correlated 
to ht . GMM are therefore more reliable than OLS estimates, which assume zero average 
individual noises. On the other hand, since both GMM and OLS give significant parameter 
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estimates, the usefulness of the forecast revisions in explaining the forecast errors is 
established clearly. In other words, the predictability of forecast errors and their revision 
cannot be ascribed to invalid exogeneity assumptions made by OLS estimators.   
In their paper CG used lagged control variables (such as oil price or unemployment 
rate) to capture the effect of other macroeconomic determinants on inflation forecast errors. 
In these extended regressions, the null that the control variables' parameters are zero tests 
whether forecast revision due to information rigidity adequately characterize (through the  
parameter) the predictability of ex post forecast errors. The results reported in CG partially 
invalidate models with information rigidities, as the parameter of the lag of the 
unemployment rate rejects the null of zero.  
The first two columns of Table 2 replicate the CG finding of a significant lagged 
unemployment effect respectively using OLS and GMM, and column (3) report the estimates 
excluding the 1970s. If the significant unemployment effect was a mere anomaly, it would 
not have been so robustly evident over the alternative sample periods and estimation 
methods. 
Table 2 here 
Despite the significant unemployment effect, all three  estimates are also significant 
and very close to those reported in columns (1), (4) and (5) of Table 1 respectively. This 
suggests that even though an important effect is not captured (and proxied by 
unemployment), the omission cannot be related to forecast revisions. Indeed, the Andrews 
(1993) test for the OLS estimates constancy in column (1) still supports a break in 1979q3, 
indicating that the change in the monetary policy stance and great moderation both induced a 
break which cannot be offset by inclusion of the unemployment rate.  
A possible explanation of the significant unemployment parameter is that it represents a 
sort of reduced-form short-run Phillips curve effect which proxies the forecast momentum 
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that is omitted from equation (10) by the invalid restriction:  = 0. In order to investigate this 
further, in column (4) of Table 2 we estimate a specification of equation (11) which includes 
the unemployment effect (through parameter γ). The insignificant estimate of γ suggests that 
model (11), which embodies both forms of inattentiveness, better explains the forecast error 
than the CG model augmented by the unemployment effect.  
Columns (5)-(6) report GMM estimates of equation (11) where the inflation rate is 
respectively measured by the GDP deflator and CPI. The results are clear: the model with 
both forms of inattentiveness can explain the forecast error regardless of the inflation 
measure. Finally, column (7) reports the estimates of equation (11) over the full sample 
period, including the 1970s. The forecast momentum is no longer significant because it is 
possibly obscured by the noisy shocks of the period from 1970 to 1979 due to the higher 
signal to noise ratio. More specifically, the lower amount of information can be exploited to 
predict non trivial (zero) forecast momentum; on this point see also Section II and Appendix 
A1. 
The SPF predictions are not the only source of information to assess the empirical 
validity of equation (11) for the US. As noted in Appendix A2, the regressors measured by 
the forecasts series of SPF unavoidably overlap. We assess the robustness of the empirical 
findings by reporting estimates of equation (11) using another source of forecasts in Table 3: 
the semi-annual series of the Livingston survey (LS). One interesting feature of the LS 
dataset is that its regressors do not overlap and that CPI forecasts are also available for the 
1970s (enabling an extended coverage of our empirical investigation using CPI inflation). 
Table 3 here 
With LS data, both forms of inattentiveness (parameters λ and ϕ) are always significant 
regardless of the sample period and not much different from each other. If we compare the 
SPF and LS results, the estimates of λ and ϕ using CPI inflation are remarkably similar over 
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the period excluding the 1970s.  The same is true for the λ estimate over the period including 
the 1970s even though the inflation rate is measured by CPI in LS and by GDP deflator in 
SPF. However, the momentum effect ϕ parameter estimate is very different and fairly close to 
that of λ when inflation is measured by the CPI forecasts of LS but not significant when 
inflation is measured by the GDP deflator forecasts of SPF.  
The disaggregated estimates by group of forecasters indicate that academics and policy-
makers have the lowest information rigidity due to forecast revisions ( ˆ =0.53), while the 
financial sector forecasters have the highest ( ˆ =0.65). Interestingly, academic and policy-
makers experience similar informational rigidities when  ˆ =0.55. Conversely, the financial 
and non-financial sectors experience considerably higher rigidities due to forecast momentum 
when ˆ = 0.71 and 0.67 respectively. It is not surprising that academic and policy-makers 
have lower informational rigidities as they should have superior knowledge and access to 
relevant information.  
A couple of noteworthy remarks are required. The coefficient  and unemployment 
control variable captures forecast momentum related to the short-run Phillips curve 
relationship. CG suggests that a significant control variable such as unemployment 
invalidates the notion of informational rigidities, as such a variable captures the short-run 
Phillips curve trade-off. However, the current analysis shows that the statistically significant 
inclusion of the forecast momentum affirms informational rigidities. Hence, the best way to 
capture informational rigidity is to include the forecast momentum variable. 
Secondly, an explanation is required for the finding that the SPF forecast momentum is 
only significant for the period that excludes the 1970s. First and foremost, it must be noted 
that this result is not replicated for LS. This may just reflect the nature of the dataset. The 
overlapping forecast horizon for the SPF (but in the case of LS) may be important. Putting 
this issue aside, the period from the appointment of Volker and the Great Moderation has 
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clearly had a significant impact on the dynamics of actual inflation and its formation 
expectations. Following the Great Moderation, inflation persistence has reduced and the 
propagation of shocks curtailed. Prior to the Great Moderation any shocks that where 
observed in the current period would last beyond the next period. So a forecaster making a 
multi-period forecast in t is able to confidently forecast a shock that is observed in t lasting 
beyond t+h into t+h+1. This is less so after the Great Moderation, and so before the Great 
Moderation ˆ =0.  
These findings for the US can be compared with estimates by group of forecasters 
using the Barclays Basics (BB) data for the UK. BB data are available for groups of 
forecasters as quarterly averages of the inflation forecasts one and two years ahead. Similar to 
those compiled by LS, the BB data do not overlap and the survey reports forecasts over 
longer horizons (details are in Appendix A2). Two of the BB groups are of particular interest: 
business economists and financial directors. They correspond closely to the two LS groups: 
non-financial sector and financial sector forecasters. Using the same BB dataset, Easaw and 
Golinelli (2010) found that the group of business economists displayed features consistent 
with professional forecasters, who acquire information before the others.  
Table 4 outlines estimates of equation (11) by using alternative estimators (OLS, IV 
and GMM) for both business economists' and financial directors' forecasts: 
Table 4 here 
As with LS data, even though instrumental variable approaches have better statistical 
properties than OLS, results in Table 4 suggest a similar pattern to that for the US: UK 
forecasts revisions and momentum are always significant explanatory variables of the 
forecast errors. Business economists are less inattentive than financial directors. This is 
coherent with the findings in Easaw and Golinelli (2010) and also with the estimates in the 
last two columns of Table 3 for the US. 
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V. Summary and Concluding Remarks: 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the structure and dynamics of professional 
forecasters of inflation. Recent papers have focused on their forecast errors and how it may 
relate to informational rigidities. In this paper we extend the existing literature by considering 
a second form of inattentiveness.  
 Both forms of inattentiveness relate to the necessary activity a professional forecaster 
needs to undertake and, therefore, are related to each other. Professional who forecast 
inflation rates need to, in the first instance, update their information set and revise their 
forecast from the previous period. Professional forecasters may also wish to perform a multi-
period forecast of inflation, and in this instance they are assessing the momentum of future 
inflation. As in the case with the short-run Phillips curve trade-off, they need to assess the 
propagation, or persistence, or transitory shocks, or the inflation gap. Both instances involves 
the ability to observe relevant but different information and, therefore, the forms of 
inattentiveness. They are also related because the existence of inattentiveness when revising 
their forecasts necessitates resorting to their multi-period forecasts in the previous period. 
Importantly, the existence of the second form relating to forecasting momentum indicates that 
inattentiveness arises as a result of imperfect information (rather than sticky information).   
 The empirical investigation using various surveys of professional forecasts for both 
the US and the UK establishes the existence of both forms of inattentiveness. It also clearly 
indicates that short-run Phillips curve reflecting inflation momentum captured by the 
unemployment effect is best depicted by this form of inattentiveness. The structure of the 
professional’s forecast error is now considerably extended and different, with direct 
implications for the persistence of real effects 
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Appendix A1: Inflation Persistence and the Signal to Noise Ratio in the UC Model 
The general unobservable components (UC) representation of the observable inflation 
rate is defined as: 
ttt    (A1.1) 
where the unobserved stochastic trend, or permanent, component is assumed to be a random 
walk: 
ttt   1  (A1.2) 
and the disturbance t   iid N(0, 
2
 ) is the permanent innovation. We also assume that the 
unobservable inflation gap has the following stationary and invertible ARMA(1,0) 
representation: 
ttt   1  (A1.3) 
where 
t   iid N(0, 
2
 ) is the transitory innovation, which may be correlated with the 
permanent innovations through the covariance 
8
 Following, for example, Morley et al. 
(2003), if we substitute the permanent component (A1.2) and the inflation gap (A1.3) in the 
UC model (A1.1), we obtain the canonical form of the UC model that has the reduced-form 
ARIMA representation: 
ttt LLLL  )1()1()1)(1(   . In terms of stationary 
inflation changes, the canonical form above can be also seen as: 

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  (A1.4) 
The 
t  autocovariances of order zero and one (that is, i  for i = 0, and 1) measure 
what the forecaster is able to learn in the short run about the persistence of such inflation 
                                                 
8
 Similarly to Morley et al. (2003), we assume that the covariance between permanent and transitory innovations 
is different from zero only at lag zero. 
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changes. These autocovariances can be expressed in terms of the hyperparameters of the UC 
model as follows: 
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Therefore, the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of (A1.4) is: 
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If we define the signal to noise ratio as 
2
2




s  and the correlation coefficient between 
permanent and transitory innovations as 




r , the representation of AC1, or the 
persistence of the changes in the inflation rate, can be expressed as follows: 
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  (A1.6) 
The information available to the forecaster is noisier as s goes to zero (i.e. when the signal to 
noise approaches very low values) and r goes either to one or minus one (i.e. the correlation 
between the permanent and transitory innovations approaches its maximum levels).  
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Figure A1.1 reports alternative AC1 dynamics of (A1.6) as a function of the persistence 
of the inflation gap ρ (from zero to 0.9, i.e., from the case of only noise to that of a very high 
persistence)
9
 in noisy situations, when r= 1 or = -1 and s = 0.1 or 0.5. 
Figure A1.1 here 
The low level of information which the forecaster can extract in the short run from past 
values of the changes to the inflation rate tends to be even lower when the inflation gap is 
more persistent. This pattern continues independently from the positive or negative 
covariance between permanent and transitory innovations. Also, the signal to noise level (s = 
0.1 or 0.5) does not appear to be relevant in shaping the short run information content of past 
values of inflation.  
Stock and Watson (2007) find that from the 1960s up to the beginning of the 1980s the 
autocorrelation of 
t  at lag 1 was -0.187, then over the great moderation phase (since 1984) 
it went to -0.416 corroborating their random walk plus noise model where the correlation 
between permanent and transitory innovations is assumed to be zero.  
 
 
  
                                                 
9
 Stock and Watson (2007) find that the univariate inflation process is well described by a random walk plus 
noise model with stochastic volatility or, equivalently, the inflation rate is a reduced-form ARIMA(0,1,1) model. 
More explicitly, that in (A1.3) ρ = 0.  
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Appendix A2 - Variables Definition and Their Preliminary Analysis 
The Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) regression data 
10
 
The specification of equation (11) that is consistent with the timing of the quarterly SPF 
forecasts is the following: 
32,113,13,3,3 )]()([
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

   (A2.1) 
where the forecast update is )()()( 3,13,3,   ttttttttt FFF  , and the latter term is the 
first lag of the forecast time series )( 4,1  tttF  . 
Data for the GDP deflator inflation rate, which measures actual inflation ( t ), are 
obtained from the levels of GDP deflator (PGDP) of the NIPA vintages available at the 
month the SPF is conducted (i.e. in February, May, August and November) using the 
formula: 
100*( PGDP/PGDP(-4) -1 )       
The use of data vintages is motivated by the relevant revisions which affect NIPA releases. 
The source of data vintages is the Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
The CPI inflation rate, the alternative measure of actual inflation ( t ), is computed 
from the averages of the monthly seasonally adjusted levels of the Consumer Price Index for 
All Urban Consumers: All Items (CPIAUCSL) using the formula: 
100*( CPIUCSL/ CPIUCSL (-4) -1 )      
                                                 
10
 For further information, see the following link to the SPF site at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia: 
http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/ 
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Data revisions are almost ineffective for quarterly frequencies, as they are only due to 
the seasonal adjustments of some items. The source of data vintages is ALFRED (ArchivaL 
Federal Reserve Economic Data), at the Economic Research Division of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis. 
The two forecasts )( 3, tttF   and )( 4,1  tttF   for both PGDP and CPI inflation rates are 
computed by defining P = PGDP or P = CPI in the following formulas, written in terms of 
the SPF labels (for details, see also the SPF survey documentation): 
onestepP =100*( ((1+P2/100)*(1+P3/100)*(1+P4/100)*(1+P5/100))^.25 -1)     
multistepP =100*( ((1+P3/100)*(1+P4/100)*(1+P5/100)*(1+P6/100))^.25 -1)   
More explicitly, as highlighted in CG, the one-year-ahead forecast of P is defined as the 
mean of the SPF forecasts released in quarter t for the current and the next three quarters (i.e. 
t,t+1, t+2, t+3), in symbols )( 3, tttF  ; the corresponding multi-step forecast is the mean of 
the SPF forecasts - again released in quarter t - for the next four quarters (i.e. t+1, t+2, t+3, 
t+4), in symbols: )( 4,1  tttF  . Therefore, the one-step- and the multistep-ahead horizons of 
the SPF forecasts overlap for three quarters.  
The forecast error )( 3,3   tttt F  , the explanatory forecast update )( 3,  tttF   = 
)()( 3,13,   tttttt FF  , and the forecast momentum )()( 2,113,1   tttttt FF   combine the 
three variables described above.  
Given that stationarity is one of the assumptions to be met in order to support the IV-
GMM statistical properties, Figure A1 depicts the temporal patterns of the three variables in 
equation (A2.1) over the period 1969q4-2013q1 which suggest mean reversion. Apart from 
episodes of quite persistent under-prediction of the inflation rate during the 70s (mainly due 
to the oil shocks), in the rest of the sample forecast errors tend to fluctuate around zero. In 
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general, the forecast revisions are prevalently downwards, especially immediately after the 
period of the oil shocks in the 70s. Finally, apart from the first half of the 80s and excluding 
the year 1991, the forecast momentum is positively persistent continuing up to the end of last 
century.  
Figure A2.1 [about here] 
The stationary of these patterns is confirmed by formal testing. Elliott et al. (1996) 
DFGLS test statistics (with intercept and MAIC automatic selection from a maximum lag 
equal to 5) for the dependent forecast error is -2.203 and -2.409 (GDP and CPI inflation); for 
the explanatory forecast update is -3.524 and -3.862 (GDP and CPI inflation); and for the 
forecast momentum is -1.658 and -1.623 (GDP and CPI inflation), against -2.58, -1.94 and -
1.61 DFGLS critical values at 1, 5, and 10%. Therefore, the null of the unit root is always 
rejected.  
The Livingston Survey (LS) regressions' data 
11
 
The model that can be estimated for the Livingston data where h=1 and the frequency 
of both forecast releases and multistep ahead is semi-annual. Therefore, the notation of 
equation (11) becomes: 
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where: )()()( 1111   tttttt FFF  . As data frequency is semi-annual, t+1 refers one 
semester ahead of t.  
                                                 
11
 For further information, see the following link at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia: 
http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/livingston-survey/ 
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The actual semi-annual CPI inflation rate, t , is computed from the levels of the 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items, (monthly, seasonally adjusted, 
label CPIAUCSL) using the following formula with monthly data: 
100*( (CPIAUCSL/CPIAUCSL(-6))^2 -1 ) 
The monthly data are then converted into semi-annual by taking the monthly inflation 
at the beginning of the month in which the Livingston Survey is conducted (i.e. in June and 
December). Similar to the quarterly SPF case, semi-annual frequency data revisions are 
almost ineffective. They only arise due to the seasonal adjustments of some items. The source 
of data on consumer price index is, again, ALFRED. 
The one- and two-semesters ahead predictions of CPI, )( 1ttF   and )( 2ttF  , are 
respectively computed using the following formula in terms of the Livingston Survey's data 
(for details, see also the survey documentation): 
f6m  = 100*( (Forecast6Month/BasePeriod     )^(12/8) -1 ) 
f12m = 100*( (Forecast12Month/Forecast6Month)^(12/6) -1 ) 
There are two noteworthy points: (a) the two measures, f6m and f12m, cover two 
consecutive non-overlapping semesters; (b) f6m is only a proxy of the genuine one-semester 
ahead forecast, as the Base Period is the last monthly historical value known at the time the 
questionnaire is mailed (i.e. in April and October). In fact, Forecast0Month would have been 
the most appropriate starting point for the genuine f6m, but it has only been available since 
1992. However, it is interesting that over the period in which they have both been available, 
the two measures have a 3% stationary (1, -1) cointegration vector in a data-congruent 
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VAR(2) representation without intercept,
12
 and the genuine measure is weakly exogenous: 
the two months of news that it embodies significantly reduce the measurement error affecting 
f6m. In other words, the two measures share the same stochastic trend (the genuine f6m), and 
their discrepancy is a temporary measurement error. This error in f6m, due to a lack of 
relevant news occurring in the subsequent two months, gives additional support for 
estimating our models with GMM estimators in which past realizations of the same variables 
are valid instruments. Genuine information is bound to be persistent, but unrelated with the 
future measurement error. 
Here too we have to establish whether the three variables of interest are stationary. 
Figure A2.2 reports the temporal pattern of the three variables of interest over the period 
1970s1-2013s2. Understandably the patterns closely mimic SPF.  
Figure A2.2  here 
The DFGLS test statistics proposed by Elliott et al. (1996) (with intercept and MAIC 
automatic selection from a maximum lag equal to 3) for the forecast error is -2.710; for the 
forecast revision is -4.318; and for the forecast momentum is -4.524, against DFGLS critical 
values of -2.58, -1.94 and -1.61 at 1, 5, and 10%. Hence, the null of the unit root is always 
rejected at 1%. 
 
The Barclays Basix (BB) regressions' data  
Equation (11) can be estimated with BB quarterly data using the following notation: 
                                                 
12
 In this paper, when needed, we always tested for the cointegration rank and weak exogeneity by following the 
cointegrated VAR approach of Johansen (1995).  
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where the forecast revision is defined as: )()()( 4,144,14,1   ttttttttt FFF  . Notably, 
BB regressors are not overlapping. 
The actual inflation rate t  is defined on the basis of the levels of the Retail Prices 
Index (RPI): monthly index numbers of retail prices 1947-2014 (base 1987m1=100, CHAW) 
using the formula: 
100*( (CHAW/CHAW(-12)) -1 ) 
Monthly data are then converted to quarterly by taking the most recently available 
monthly inflation known in the first month of each quarter with respect to the corresponding 
month of the previous year. The source of data on RPI is the Office for National Statistics.
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The one- and two-years ahead forecasts are denoted by )( 4,1  tttF   and )( 8,5  tttF   
respectively, and are compiled by Barclays Basix, based on surveys of various sections of the 
UK population about their expected inflation rate over the period 1986Q4-2005Q1. The 
available dataset reports the mean forecasts for the professional forecasters, or business 
economists, and for other groups of forecasters, but does not report the individual forecasts. 
The agents surveyed are asked their expectations of RPI in the following way: “Can you tell 
me what you expect the rate of inflation to be over the next twelve months?”. The answers 
represent the one-year-ahead forecasts (label F1Yj, where j = business economists, academic, 
                                                 
13
 Although, in accordance with the Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007, the Retail Prices Index and its 
derivatives have been assessed against the Code of Practice for Official Statistics and found not to meet the 
required standards for designation as National Statistics, we use RPI because BB survey questions explicitly 
refer to it. 
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trade unionist, finance directors). The agents were then asked: “And how about the following 
twelve months?”. This represents the two-year-ahead forecasts (label F2Yj). Further details 
and discussion can be found in Easaw and Golinelli (2010). 
As with SPF and LS, we investigate empirically whether the three variables of equation 
(A2.3) are stationary. Figure A2.3 reports their temporal pattern over the period 1987q4-
2005q1. It indicates slightly greater persistence over time than the US case. Signals from 
1992 to the end of the sample tend to converge towards zero for all the variables, coupled 
with lower inflation volatility. In fact since 1992q4 there has been a period of stable inflation 
when informal inflation targeting began (interest rate decisions were still made by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer while there was an inflation target). Since 1997q4 UK further 
evolved towards a regime of inflation targeting under an operationally independent Bank of 
England. 
Figure A2.3 here 
In the DFGLS test by Elliott et al. (1996) (with intercept and MAIC automatic selection 
from a maximum lag equal to 5) the null of the unit root is always rejected at 5%. The test 
statistic for the forecast error is -2.391, the forecast revision is -2.265, and the forecast 
momentum is -2.078, against DFGLS critical values of -2.58, -1.94 and -1.61 at 1, 5, and 
10%. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 - Estimates of the Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) model with SPF 
a
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 Start in: 1969q1 
 
1980q1 
 
1970q1 
 
1970q1 
 
1980q1 
 
1981q4 
 
1981q4 
 
Estimation method:  OLS 
 
OLS 
 
IV 
 
GMM 
 
GMM 
 
OLS 
 
GMM 
 
Inflation measure: GDP 
 
GDP 
 
GDP 
 
GDP 
 
GDP 
 
CPI 
 
CPI 
 
  b 
0.5481 
*** 
0.2481 
*** 
0.6630 
*** 
0.6366 
*** 
0.4979 
*** 
0.2531 
** 
0.4108 
*** 
(0.1017) 
 
(0.0922) 
 
(0.0579) 
 
(0.0447) 
 
(0.0620) 
 
(0.1167) 
 
(0.0588) 
 
Intercept 
-0.0243 
 
-0.3217 
*** 
-0.0306 
 
-0.1057 
 
-0.2581 
*** 
-0.1217 
 
-0.0747 
 (0.1331) 
 
(0.1008) 
 
(0.1131) 
 
(0.0809) 
 
(0.0832) 
 
(0.1459) 
 
(0.0963) 
 
T 
c
 172 
 
133 
 
171 
 
171 
 
133 
 
127 
 
127 
 Mean 
d
 -0.0304 
 
-0.3536 
 
-0.0423 
 
-0.0423 
 
-0.3536 
 
-0.1603 
 
-0.1603 
 
SER 
e
 1.0646 
 
0.6499 
 
1.1116 
 
1.0885 
 
0.6885 
 
1.0711 
 
1.0838 
 
Specification tests: 
f
 
 
 
 
       
 
   - Andrews (1993) 1979q3 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Hausman (1978) 
 
 
 
 
0.0000
 
0.0246
 
0.1111 
 
 
 
0.1274 
 
- Hansen (1982) 
 
 
 
 
0.0538 
 
0.4641 
 
0.3479 
 
 
 
0.6058 
 
(
a
)   33,13,3,3 )()(
1
)(  

 ttttttttttt InterceptFFF 


 . Estimation period: from start to 2013q1 with quarterly data (q=quarter); the initial period (start) of the 
samples in different columns is reported in the row labelled "Start in". Estimation method: OLS, IV (Sargan, 1958) and GMM (Hamsen, 1982). Inflation measure: GDP 
deflator or CPI (consumer price index). In bold: estimates; in parentheses: HAC standard errors, see Newey and West (1987); 
***
 
**
 and 
*
 denote significance from zero at 1, 5 
and 10% levels.  
(
b
) In CG (Table 1, panel B, first column) the implicit OLS estimate of  is 0.552.  
(
c
) The number of observations of the full sample with OLS (172) is apparently not coherent with that of IV (171) because of the effect of some missing quarterly observations 
in years 1969 and 1970, and in 1974q4. To ease comparisons, IV and GMM samples are restricted to be the same (i.e. T=171 observations). 
(
d
) Mean of the one-semester ahead forecast errors. 
(
e
) Standard error of the regression. 
(
f
) P-values. Andrews (1993) = MaxF test statistic for structural change with unknown break date (trimming 20%) for OLS estimates (if significant, the break date is 
reported); Hausman (1978) test for weak exogeneity (IV and GMM estimates); Hansen (1982) J test statistic for over-identification restrictions. 
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Table 2 - Estimates of the model with the two forms of inattentiveness with SPF 
a
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 Start in: 1969q1 
 
1969q1 
 
1980q1 
 
1980q1 
 
1980q1 
 
1981q4 
 
1969q1 
 Estimation method:  OLS 
 
GMM 
 
GMM 
 
GMM 
 
GMM 
 
GMM 
 
GMM 
 Inflation measure: GDP 
 
GDP 
 
GDP 
 
GDP 
 
GDP 
 
CPI 
 
GDP 
 
   
0.5185 
*** 
0.6262 
*** 
0.4460 
*** 
0.6566 
*** 
0.6675 
*** 
0.5903 
*** 
0.6911 
*** 
(0.1101) 
 
(0.0540) 
 
(0.0304) 
 
(0.0579) 
 
(0.0523) 
 
(0.0575) 
 
(0.0460) 
 
  b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.4633 
** 
0.4353 
** 
0.6062 
** 
-0.1619 
 
    
 
 
(0.2275) 
 
(0.2149) 
 
(0.2848) 
 
(0.2218) 
 
  -0.1770
*** 
-0.1151
** 
-0.0702 
*** 
-0.0456 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (0.0676) 
 
(0.0565) 
 
(0.0250) 
 
(0.0496) 
       
Intercept 
1.1037 
** 
0.5506 
 
0.1372 
 
0.0621 
 
-0.1983 
** 
-0.0600 
 
-0.0679 
 (0.4921) 
 
(0.3727) 
 
(0.1946) 
 
(0.2955) 
 
(0.0813) 
 
(0.1359) 
 
(0.0920) 
 
T  172 
 
172 
 
133 
 
133 
 
133 
 
127 
 
172 
 Mean 
c
 -0.0304 
 
-0.0304 
 
-0.3536 
 
-0.3536 
 
-0.3536 
 
-0.1603 
 
-0.0304 
 
SER 
d
 1.0308 
 
1.0766 
 
0.6657 
 
0.8440 
 
0.8623 
 
1.1703 
 
1.1612 
 
Specification tests: 
e
 
    
 
 
        
- Andrews (1993) 1979q3 *** 
  
 
 
        - Hansen (1982) 
  
0.1917
 
0.5070 
 
0.2724
 
0.4298
 
0.3380
 
0.3597
 
 
(
a
)   312,113,13,13,3,3 )]()([
1
)()(
1
)(  



 tttttttttttttttttt InterceptUnemplFFFFF 





 .  
Estimation period: from start to 2013q1 with quarterly data (q=quarter); the initial period (start) of the samples in different columns is reported in the row labelled "Start in". 
Estimation method: OLS and GMM (Hamsen, 1982). Inflation measure: GDP deflator or CPI (consumer price index). In bold: estimates; in parentheses: HAC standard errors, 
see Newey and West (1987); 
***
 
**
 and 
*
 denote significance from zero at 1, 5 and 10% levels.  
(
b
) CG impose the restriction ϕ = 0.  
(
c
) Mean of the one-semester ahead forecast errors. 
(
d
) Standard error of the regression. 
(
e
) P-values. Andrews (1993) = MaxF test statistic for structural change with unknown break date (trimming 20%) for OLS estimates (if significant, the break date is 
reported); Hansen (1982) J test statistic for over-identification restrictions. 
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Table 3 - GMM estimates using time-series means of the Livingston Survey data 
a
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
Group: 
b All forecasters
 
Policy 
Govt. & 
Academic 
 
Financial  
sector  
Non-
Financial 
sector 
 
Start in: 1980s1 
 
1970s1 
 
1970s1 
 
1970s1 
 
1970s1 
 
  c 0.5831 
*** 
0.6839 ***
 
0.5388 ***
 
0.6515 ***
 
0.6261 ***
 
(0.0963) 
 
(0.0440) 
 
(0.0907) 
 
(0.0634) 
 
(0.0411) 
 
  0.6336 
** 
0.6814 ***
 
0.5523 ***
 
0.7087 ***
 
0.6675 ***
 
(0.2669) 
 
(0.1870) 
 
(0.1193) 
 
(0.1965) 
 
(0.2793) 
 
Intercept 
0.3115 
 
0.5964 **
 
0.7675 **
 
0.5591 **
 
0.4509 *
 
(0.3599) 
 
(0.2889) 
 
(0.2220) 
 
(0.2500) 
 
(0.2565) 
 
T 68 
 
88 
 
88 
 
88 
 
88 
 Mean 
d -0.0402 
 
0.5136 
 
0.6475 
 
0.5273 
 
0.4155 
 SER 
e 2.0495 
 
2.4880 
 
2.4957 
 
2.5982 
 
2.4772 
 J-test 
f 0.5791 
 
0.5170 
 
0.4232 
 
0.3568 
 
0.6262 
 
(
a
) 
1111111 )]()([
1
)(
1
)(  



 tttttttttt FFFF 





 . Estimation period: from start 
to 2013s2 with semi-annual data (s=semester); the initial period (start) of the samples in different columns is 
reported in the row labelled "Start in". In bold: GMM estimates; in parentheses: HAC standard errors, see Newey 
and West (1987); 
***
 
**
 and 
*
 denote significance from zero at 1, 5 and 10% levels.  
(
b
) Definition of the group (more information in the Livingston Survey Documentation on the website of the FRB 
of Philadelphia): Policy, Govt. and Academic = Academic Institutions + Consulting + Federal Reserve + 
Government; Financial sector = Commercial Banking (B) + Insurance Company (R) + Investment  Banking (I); 
Non-Financial sector = Industry Trade Group + Labor + Non-Financial Businesses. In this way, the sum of our 
three groups almost coincides with "All forecasters". 
(
c
) Over a similar period, CG (Table 4) implicit OLS estimates of  (with  restricted to zero) are: 0.51 (all 
forecasters); 0.31 (academic institutions); 0.45 (commercial banks); 0.38 (non-financial business); for comparing 
their categories with ours, see footnote b above. 
(
d
) Mean of the one-semester ahead forecast errors. 
(
e
) Standard error of the regression. 
(
f
) Hansen (1982) test of over-identification restrictions (p-values).
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Table 4 - Estimates of the model with the two forms of inattentiveness with UK 
forecasters groups 
a
 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5)  (6)  
Group: Business economists
 
Financial directors 
Estimation method:  OLS 
 
IV 
 
GMM 
 
OLS 
 
IV  GMM  
  
0.4910 
*** 
0.3822 
*** 
0.3817 
*** 
0.4202 
*** 
0.4236 
*** 
0.3972 
*** 
(0.0813) 
 
(0.0950) 
 
(0.0789) 
 
(0.0744) 
 
(0.0474) 
 
(0.0512) 
 
  0.6492 
** 
0.6732 
*** 
0.8704 
*** 
0.9875 
** 
0.9585 
*** 
0.9084 
*** 
(0.3113) 
 
(0.1743) 
 
(0.2310) 
 
(0.4290) 
 
(0.1258) 
 
(0.1034) 
 
Intercept 
0.2124 
 
0.2284 
 
0.2080 
 
-0.0051 
 
0.0254 
 
0.1256 
*** 
(0.3245) 
 
(0.1515) 
 
(0.2034) 
 
(0.3240) 
 
(0.0969) 
 
(0.0248) 
 
T 70 
 
70 
 
70 
 
70 
 
70 
 
70 
 
Mean 
b
 0.0543 
 
0.0543 
 
0.0543 
 
-0.0871 
 
-0.0871 
 
-0.0871 
 
SER 
c
 1.3445 
 
1.3659 
 
1.3664 
 
1.3427 
 
1.3430 
 
1.3508 
 
Specification tests 
d
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Hausman (1978)  
 
0.0416 
 
0.1325 
 
 
 
0.1817 
 
0.0041 
 
- Hansen (1982)  
 
0.1355 
 
0.1854 
 
 
 
0.0614 
 
0.2552 
 
(
a
) 
4,344,144,14,14 )]()([
1
)(
1
)(  



 tttttttttttttt FFFF 





 . Estimation period: from 1987q4 to 
2005q1 with quarterly data (q=quarter). In bold: model's estimates; in parentheses: HAC standard errors, see Newey and 
West (1987); 
***
 
**
 and 
*
 denote significance from zero at 1, 5 and 10% levels.  
(
b
) Mean of the one-semester ahead forecast errors. 
(
c
) Standard error of the regression. 
(
d
) P-values. Hausman (1978) test for weak exogeneity (IV and GMM estimates); Hansen (1982) J test statistic for over-
identification restrictions.
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  Figure A1.1 - The pattern of the 1
st
 order autocorrelation of 
t  
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       Figure A2.1 - The variables of interest, means of SPF individual data 
a 
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0
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GDP inflation
CPI inflation
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GDP inflation
CPI inflation
forecast momentum
 
(
a
) In equation (A1), forecast errors are the dependent variable; forecast revision is the 
first explanatory, and forecasts momentum is the second explanatory variable. 
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Figure A2.2 - The variables of interest, means of Livingston individual data 
a
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-1
0
1
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-12
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4
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(
a
) Forecast error in the right hand scale; forecast revision and momentum in the left hand scale. 
)( 11   t
P
tt E  = forecast error in t+1 (i.e. the dependent variable);  
)()()( 1111   t
P
tt
P
tt
P
t EEE   = forecast revision/update (change in inflation forecast for t+1 made in t-1 
and in t); )()( 111 t
P
tt
P
t EE    = forecast momentum (i.e. change in forecast from one- to two-semesters ahead). 
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Figure A2.3 - The variables of interest, means of Barclays-Basix groups 
a
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(
a
) Forecast error in the right hand scale; forecast revision and momentum in the left hand scale. 
In equation (A1), forecast errors are the dependent variable; forecast revision is the first expla-natory, and 
forecasts momentum is the second explanatory variable. 
 
 
 
